Imagen de Google Jackets

Posted Price Offers in Internet Auction Markets [electronic resource] / by Stefan Seifert.

Por: Tipo de material: TextoTextoSeries Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 580 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 580Editor: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2006Descripción: XIV, 184 p. online resourceTipo de contenido:
  • text
Tipo de medio:
  • computer
Tipo de soporte:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9783540352686
Trabajos contenidos:
  • SpringerLink (Online service)
Tema(s): Formatos físicos adicionales: Sin títuloClasificación CDD:
  • 658.40301 23
Clasificación LoC:
  • HD30.23
Recursos en línea:
Contenidos:
Springer eBooksResumen: New information technologies allow for the design of innovative electronic markets which can improve the efficiency of trading. In this context, several internet marketplaces have recently extended the flexibility of their selling mechanisms by creating hybrid institutions which combine an auction with a fixed price offer so that buyers can choose to bid in the auction or to acquire the item for the fixed price. Applying a Market Engineering approach, this book introduces a model of an auction with a posted price offer and investigates the characteristics of such mechanisms. It discusses the respective equilibrium strategies of both the sellers and the bidders which provide useful insights into understanding actual behavior. The theoretical results are compared with strategies of students in a controlled experiment. The experimental observations indicate shortcomings of standard economic theories and help to further improve electronic markets.
Etiquetas de esta biblioteca: No hay etiquetas de esta biblioteca para este título. Ingresar para agregar etiquetas.
Valoración
    Valoración media: 0.0 (0 votos)
No hay ítems correspondientes a este registro

Model of the APPO Market Institution -- Design of the APPO Experiment -- Results of the Experiment -- Conclusion and Outlook.

New information technologies allow for the design of innovative electronic markets which can improve the efficiency of trading. In this context, several internet marketplaces have recently extended the flexibility of their selling mechanisms by creating hybrid institutions which combine an auction with a fixed price offer so that buyers can choose to bid in the auction or to acquire the item for the fixed price. Applying a Market Engineering approach, this book introduces a model of an auction with a posted price offer and investigates the characteristics of such mechanisms. It discusses the respective equilibrium strategies of both the sellers and the bidders which provide useful insights into understanding actual behavior. The theoretical results are compared with strategies of students in a controlled experiment. The experimental observations indicate shortcomings of standard economic theories and help to further improve electronic markets.

ZDB-2-SBE

No hay comentarios en este titulo.

para colocar un comentario.