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Co-Financing Hollywood Film Productions with Outside Investors [electronic resource] : An Economic Analysis of Principal Agent Relationships in the U.S. Motion Picture Industry / by Kay H. Hofmann.

Por: Tipo de material: TextoTextoSeries Markt- und Unternehmensentwicklung / Markets and Organisations | Markt- und Unternehmensentwicklung / Markets and OrganisationsEditor: Wiesbaden : Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden : Imprint: Springer Gabler, 2013Descripción: XVIII, 159 p. 10 illus. online resourceTipo de contenido:
  • text
Tipo de medio:
  • computer
Tipo de soporte:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9783658007874
Trabajos contenidos:
  • SpringerLink (Online service)
Tema(s): Formatos físicos adicionales: Sin títuloClasificación CDD:
  • 330 23
Clasificación LoC:
  • Libro electrónico
Recursos en línea:
Contenidos:
Springer eBooksResumen: Co-financing arrangements in which investors from outside the motion picture industry become co-owners of the completed films are a common phenomenon in Hollywood. Kay H. Hofmann analyzes the conflicts of interest and the organizational problems that may arise between the experienced major studios and investors with comparably low industry expertise. Guided by principal agent theory, the empirical analysis provides evidence for adverse selection and moral hazard. Based on his findings, the author develops solutions that are not only relevant for investors but also for film producers who rely on the long-term availability of external funds.
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The Business of Motion Picture Production and Distribution -- Co-Financing Film Projects with External Investors -- Principal Agent Problems in Co-Financing Relationships -- Empirical Investigation of Adverse Selection and Moral Hazard -- Managerial Implications and Developments in the Co-Financing Market.

Co-financing arrangements in which investors from outside the motion picture industry become co-owners of the completed films are a common phenomenon in Hollywood. Kay H. Hofmann analyzes the conflicts of interest and the organizational problems that may arise between the experienced major studios and investors with comparably low industry expertise. Guided by principal agent theory, the empirical analysis provides evidence for adverse selection and moral hazard. Based on his findings, the author develops solutions that are not only relevant for investors but also for film producers who rely on the long-term availability of external funds.

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