Locational Tournaments in the Context of the EU Competitive Environment [electronic resource] : A New Institutional Economics Approach to Foreign Direct Investment Policy Competition between Governments in Europe / by Stephan J. Dreyhaupt.

Context of the Research -- Objective and Structure of the Study -- Theoretical Framework -- Theories of Foreign Direct Investment -- Locational Competition and Government Intervention -- The New Institutional Economics Theory -- Governance of Foreign Direct Investment Policy Competition in Europe -- European FDI Competition in Perspective -- The Institutional Environment for Policy Competition in Europe -- Governance Models for Investment Promotion in Europe -- Harnessing the Power of FDI Competition: An EU Policy Agenda -- Evaluating the Overall Effectiveness of FDI Competition -- Reviewing the EU Approach to Regulating FDI Policy Competition -- Regional Integration and FDI Competition -- Institutional Issues and Policy Implications -- Political Economy Aspects of FDI Policy Competition -- International Regime Theory and Foreign Direct Investment -- Institutional Choice and Cooperation in FDI Competition -- Is the EU Competition Framework a Model for International FDI Regimes? -- Conclusions -- Conclusions.

The last decade has witnessed a dramatic change in attitude towards foreign direct investment (FDI) and a significant increase in competition between governments to attract FDI as a result. These "locational tournaments" are perpetuated not simply by classical factor endowments, but also by government interventions that impact both market imperfections and FDI flows. Based on the practical insights and experience gained in his professional work on FDI in developing countries at the World Bank, and using the EU's competition framework as an example, Stephan J. Dreyhaupt analyses whether or not a multilateral system of investment rules can be economically and politically effective. He also examines what constitutes a viable arrangement for inter-jurisdictional and inter-regional FDI governance. The author applies the framework of the New Institutional Economics analysis to the study of FDI competition to buttress the main research contention that FDI policy competition requires adequate institutional choices in order to be effective and efficient.