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Auctions in the Electricity Market [electronic resource] / edited by Stefan Schȵne.

Por: Tipo de material: TextoTextoSeries Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 617 | Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems ; 617Editor: Berlin, Heidelberg : Springer Berlin Heidelberg, 2009Descripción: online resourceTipo de contenido:
  • text
Tipo de medio:
  • computer
Tipo de soporte:
  • online resource
ISBN:
  • 9783540853657
Trabajos contenidos:
  • SpringerLink (Online service)
Tema(s): Formatos físicos adicionales: Sin títuloClasificación CDD:
  • 333.7 23
Clasificación LoC:
  • HC79.E5
Recursos en línea:
Contenidos:
Springer eBooksResumen: Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules. The author develops a non-cooperative auction model analyzing the bidding behavior of producers at power exchanges. Producers are limited by the production capacity of their power plants. Production costs are affiliated. This allows for independence or positive correlation. The author analyzes and compares a uniform-price, a discriminatory, and a generalized second-price auction. Optimal bids, cost efficiency, profits, and consumer prices are examined. A simple probability density function of affiliated production costs is given and used for examples. Numerical results are presented. The results of the analysis can help improving the bidding strategies of producers, selecting the best auction type at power exchanges or detecting price manipulations.
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Literature Review -- Model -- Results -- Conclusion.

Electricity is an essential commodity traded at power exchanges. Its price is very volatile within a day and over the year. This raises questions about the efficiency of the trading rules. The author develops a non-cooperative auction model analyzing the bidding behavior of producers at power exchanges. Producers are limited by the production capacity of their power plants. Production costs are affiliated. This allows for independence or positive correlation. The author analyzes and compares a uniform-price, a discriminatory, and a generalized second-price auction. Optimal bids, cost efficiency, profits, and consumer prices are examined. A simple probability density function of affiliated production costs is given and used for examples. Numerical results are presented. The results of the analysis can help improving the bidding strategies of producers, selecting the best auction type at power exchanges or detecting price manipulations.

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